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ABSTRACT 
This research intends to improve information dominance in the maritime domain by 
optimizing tactical mobile ad hoc network (MANET) systems for wireless sharing of 
biometric data in maritime interdiction operations (MIO). Current methods for sharing 
biometric data in MIO are unnecessarily slow and do not leverage wireless networks at 
the tactical edge to maximize information dominance. Field experiments allow students 
to test wireless MANETs at the tactical edge. Analysis is focused on determining optimal 
MANET design and implementation. It considers various implementations with varied 
antenna selection, radio power, and frequency specifications, and two specific methods of 
integrating Department of Defense biometric collection devices to the wireless MANET, 
which utilizes a single (WR) MPU4 802.11 Wi-Fi access point to connect secure 
electronic enrollment kit II (SEEK II) biometric devices to the MANET, and tethers each 
SEEK device to a dedicated WR using a personal Ethernet connection. Biometric data is 
shared across the tactical network and transmitted to remote servers. Observations and 
analysis regarding network performance demonstrate that wireless MANETs can be 
optimized for biometric reach back and integrated with biometric devices to improve 
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In recent years, the United States’ maritime strategy has become increasingly 
focused on securing this nation’s ports and protecting international maritime commons 
against potential sea-born terrorist attacks. Specifically, the threats include chemical, 
biological, and radiological nuclear (CBRN) weapons and traditional terrorist activity. 
Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Government Accountability Office research [1] 
shows that information sharing in maritime interdiction operations (MIO) and visit board 
search and seizure (VBSS) operations in littoral waters as key in successfully 
implementing this strategy. Likewise, Navy strategy for information dominance points 
out the importance of accurate and timely information sharing in the maritime domain. 
Relevant DOD and joint publications echo the importance of the same. 
Boarding teams at the forefront of maritime security operations require a rapid 
and reliable exchange of information to execute MIO and VBSS missions, which is 
especially true of biometric data regarding potential adversaries or persons of interest to 
national security. Information sharing in MIO typically begins with data captured on-site 
(a boarded vessel) during rapid site exploitation (RSE), when operators are expected to 
gather biometric and other forensic data and disseminate it to remote decision makers. In 
some cases, operators are expected to stay on site until biometric systems or analysts 
have provided responses, such as match-no-match results. These responses drive the 
actions of operators. 
Identification and verification operations, requiring biometrics collection and 
dissemination, are of particular operational value in the maritime domain in which 
adversaries can be difficult to identify because of false identification documents or a 
complete lack of documentation. Biometric data sharing directly counters this 
fundamental challenge. However, sufficiently addressing this challenge requires the DOD 
to leverage available biometric and tactical networking technologies fully. It demands 
efficient and dependable data sharing from operators to distributed nodes, on which 
authoritative data resides and analysts interact with the decision cycle. MIO operators are 
expected to make prudent decisions, based on accurate and timely information about their 
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adversaries. To occur, the highest quality biometric data must be provided to decision 
makers and operators throughout the decision cycle; a natural byproduct of achieving and 
maintaining information dominance in the maritime domain. To that end, MIO and VBSS 
operators at the tactical edge must be equipped with suitable tactical networks, capable 
biometric devices, and access to authoritative biometric databases. 
Nationally managed authoritative biometric databases, such as the DOD 
automated biometric identification system (ABIS), currently exist to support biometric 
analysis and decision making for operators. However, operators deployed to austere 
environments routinely lack network connectivity for reach back to ABIS.  
Current procedures for biometric data sharing in austere environments require 
operators use on one of two untimely and inefficient methods for biometric data sharing. 
In the first—and most common—case, operators rely on scaled-down databases residing 
locally on the biometric device. For example, Crossmatch’s Secure Electronic Enrollment 
Kit II (SEEK II) maintains a local copy of a mission or region specific biometrically 
enabled watch list (BEWL), which is regularly updated by the Biometric Information 
Management Activity (BIMA) in Clarksburg, West Virginia. Operators are expected to 
download the newest appropriate BEWL from BIMA on a regular basis. This scenario 
presents obvious shortfalls in the timeliness and accuracy of biometric data available at 
the tactical edge. For instance, biometric enrollments taken in Afghanistan today may be 
of operational significance to a VBSS team in the Arabian Gulf tomorrow. If that VBSS 
team is comparing biometric data against an outdated BEWL tomorrow, it would 
negatively impact mission success significantly. In terms of information dominance, 
operators using this option rely absolutely on manually retrieving the current BEWL. 
The second option requires operators to manually transfer newly captured 
biometric data from mobile biometric devices to a suitable network using external 
devices (universal serial bus [USB] flash drive or compact disc-rewritable [CD/RW]). 
Typically, the network to which biometric data is being transferred is geographically 
separated from the operator. For example, an afloat boarding team member must leave 
the boarded vessel and return to the mother ship’s network to transmit newly collected 
biometric data, and await results. In this situation as well, the process introduces obvious 
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inefficiencies and unnecessary opportunities for human error that reduces data quality 
and weakens efforts to achieve information dominance. 
Since 2004, the Center for Network Innovation and Experimentation (CENETIX) 
researchers at Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) have experimented with iterative 
improvements to data-sharing capabilities for various types of RSE data, including 
biometrics. To this end, CENETIX researchers bring to bear the NPS-SOCOM, or 
Special Operations Command, tactical network topology (TNT) and MIO test-bed, which 
provides a range of tactical networking systems, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
sensors, and biometric devices. Thus far, CENETIX research in the area of biometric data 
sharing has existed largely as a subset of work centered on tactical wireless networks and 
near-real-time (NRT) reach back for RSE in MIO events [2].  
In recent experiments, CENETIX researchers have tested MANET technology in 
MIO settings using WR tactical radios by Persistent Systems, which offers wireless 
operation using dynamic routing capabilities and built in security controls. Although the 
wireless MANET algorithms utilized by WR are proprietary, these tactical radios also 
support standard wireless technologies, such as IEEE 802.11 Wi-Fi and Bluetooth [3], 
[4]. This flexibility provides a wide range of options for wireless node placement and 
configurations on the tactical network, which provide MIO and VBSS boarding teams 
vital communication and reach back capabilities. However, Persistent Systems does not 
recommend any wireless operation outside of its proprietary MANET, and the 
Crossmatch SEEK II biometric collection device is not currently authorized to connect to 
DOD systems via 802.11 Wi-Fi. To this point, CENETIX researchers have not yet flexed 
the Wi-Fi capabilities of WR and SEEK II to conduct biometric data sharing in field 
experiments. Doing so provides the opportunity for an evidence-based comparative 
analysis between strictly MANET wireless operation and an integrated model that 
includes 802.11 Wi-Fi operation. 
To meet this challenge, this research advances previous CENETIX work by 
leveraging national level field experimentation, conducted in cooperation with SOCOM 
and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) Research and Development Center, as a 
testing platform for biometric data sharing over the tactical wireless MANET [5]. 
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CENETIX field experiments provide a realistic MIO environment for testing various 
models of wireless biometric data sharing and viewing, firsthand, its impact on 
information dominance in the maritime domain.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Operators conducting MIO currently use the Crossmatch SEEK II, and similar 
mobile devices, to collect biometrics during the RSE phase of MIO. Under the current 
model for employing these devices, operators are often forced to transfer biometric data 
manually from the biometric device via a USB flash memory or CD/RW to connected 
networks for dissemination to authoritative databases for comparison and analysis, or to 
depend on a locally stored and scaled down non-authoritative database for biometric 
comparison. This model for biometric data sharing unnecessarily reduces the timeliness 
and accuracy of mission data, which decreases situational awareness (SA), and 
challenges information dominance in the maritime domain. 
B. PURPOSE 
This research explores the benefits of wireless biometric data sharing in a MIO 
setting using tools within the CENETIX TNT MIO test-bed—including WR tactical 
networks and the SEEK II biometric collection device—to determine the most optimal 
integration of WR MANET, 802.11 Wi-Fi, and DOD biometric technologies to provide 
secure, reliable, NRT biometric data sharing at the tactical edge and support the Navy’s 
strategy for information dominance in the maritime domain. Based on WR manufacturer 
recommendations, and previous CENETIX research, two viable models for wireless 
biometric transfer over WR will be tested and compared during CENETIX field 
experiments. The outcomes of these experiments inform a comparative analysis of 




C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research is aimed at answering the following questions: 
• How can wireless biometric data sharing support information dominance 
in the maritime domain? 
• What is the wireless model for biometrics data sharing? 
• How can WR technologies, including 802.11 Wi-Fi, be implemented to 
optimize the performance of the CENETIX tactical network for biometric 
data sharing? 
• What changes can be made to the CENETIX tactical network to make it 
more optimal for biometric data sharing? 
• How can the Crossmatch SEEK II be integrated into tactical WR MANET 
to provide NRT reach-back to remote C2 sites for RSE and biometric data 
sharing in MIO? 
• What specific cyber security concerns exist with each of these solutions, 
and how can they mitigated? 
D. POTENTIAL BENEFITS 
This research is intended to provide a detailed analysis of various wireless 
technology and tactical network implementations that can reduce delays in RSE and 
biometric data sharing. Conclusions and recommendations should assist in optimizing 
tactical wireless networks used in MIO to support mission success and information 
dominance by reducing risk to the operator, compressing the decision cycle, and 
improving the timeliness and accuracy of mission data. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS  
1. Chapter I: Introduction 
This chapter introduces the role of biometric data sharing in the RSE phase of 
MIO and VBSS operations and provides context for the research that seeks to 





2. Chapter II: Research Foundations  
This chapter examines foundational research to support research objectives. It 
examines joint and service specific documents to demonstrate the relationship 
between wireless biometric data sharing information dominance in the maritime 
domain. It also provides technical foundations for the specific wireless 
technologies used by CENETIX to perform the wireless biometric data sharing.  
3. Chapter III: Experiments in a MIO Setting 
This chapter describes the field experiments conducted to optimize the CENETIX 
tactical network for the purpose of WR and SEEK II integration in wireless 
biometric data sharing. Iterative analysis and conclusions for each experiment 
influenced ongoing research, and are included for each experiment in this chapter. 
4. Chapter IV: Additional Analysis 
This chapter provides additional comparative analysis on matters that are not 
specifically addressed in Chapter III. Analysis from Chapters III and IV are 
crucial in developing ultimate conclusions from this research.  
5. Chapter V: Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter presents conclusions and recommendations that address the research 
questions and are based on analysis throughout the thesis. 
F. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This thesis focuses on the application of tactical wireless technologies in MIO 
strictly for the purpose of biometric data sharing during RSE. The general concepts of 
MANET, and the broader topic of wireless mesh networking technology, underpin this 
work. However, based on product availability, and the results of previous testing, 
experiments are conducted using WR radios from Persistent Systems. Various aspects of 
the WR, such as the dynamic routing algorithm, are considered proprietary. At times, 
generalizations about network behavior are required that will be supported by experiment 
data. 
The Crossmatch SEEK II is a DOD-approved handheld biometrics collection 
device with a variety of connection interfaces available for networking and data transfer. 
CENETIX has SEEK II devices on hand for testing and experimentation. Therefore, only 
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the SEEK II is used for biometric collection and during field experiments. research 
foundations  
This research was conducted using the CENETIX TNT test bed and existing DOD 
technologies used in the collection and sharing of biometric data. The CENETIX tactical 
network is a broad term encompassing many technologies and specific technological 
implementations that support ongoing experimentation and research to improve SA and 
data sharing in MIO and CBRN detection and reporting operations. The “plug and play” 
TNT test bed, as well as a range of mesh networking and MANET devices, can be rapidly 
deployed and customized for a range of operational requirements. CENETIX maintains a 
robust inventory of tactical networking devices and components from various venders 
[6].  
For the purpose of this research, the tactical network (deployed on the boarded 
vessel) is constructed with two variants of the proprietary WR radio by Persistent 
Systems, both of which typically operate as Layer 2 MANETs. In addition to the 
deployment of WR MANET to the boarded vessel, specialized devices are required for 
biometric data collection, sharing, and analysis, which includes user-operated end 
devices, as well as access to specialized databases. The biometric collection device used 
for this research is the SEEK II by Crossmatch, with Ethernet connectivity and standard 
802.11 wireless capability. For testing purposes, the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC) capability manager biometrics and forensics team provided 
CENETIX researchers access to the SOFEX portal for identity operations. CENETIX 
uses the SOFEX portal for testing biometric data against an authoritative database [7].  
This chapter serves two purposes. It describes the relationship between wireless 
biometric data sharing and information dominance in the maritime domain, and also fully 
describes each of the components and technologies required to perform wireless 
biometric data sharing using the two proposed models. 
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G. INFORMATION DOMINANCE CONSIDERATIONS 
One objective of this research is to determine how wireless biometric data sharing 
can help achieve information dominance in the maritime domain. To answer that question 
properly, insights from multiple DOD joint and service-specific strategy and policy 
documents combine to provide a comprehensive understanding of the notion of 
information dominance and its relationship to success in MIO. 
1. Quality Criteria and Information Dominance  
Information dominance is a broad term that can be applied across the entirety of 
full spectrum warfare. Achieving information dominance is essential to C2. Joint 
Publication 6-0 joint information system stresses, “In one way or another, C2 is 
essentially about information: getting it, judging its value, processing it into useful form, 
acting on it, and sharing it with others” [8]. It is clear then that information is powerful, 
and that defining information dominance is instructive in determining how existing and 
future information systems can leverage this power to strengthen operational capability. 
The U.S. Navy’s strategy for achieving information dominance defines information 
dominance as “the operational advantage gained from fully integrating the Navy’s 
information functions, capabilities and resources to optimize decision making and 
maximize warfighting effects” [9]. 
The Navy’s strategy further identifies three fundamental capabilities of 
information dominance: assured C2, battlespace awareness, and integrated fires. The 
strategy intends to combine these three capabilities to equip operational commanders 
with mobility in the information domain and create decision cycles that are faster than the 
adversary’s [9]. Assured C2 entails the ability to exchange orders and responses with 
subordinates, understand the disposition of friendly forces, target and conduct strikes, and 
assess results. Battlespace awareness refers to persistent surveillance of maritime and 
information domains, knowledge of this nation’s adversaries’ capabilities and intent, and 
an understanding of how, when, and where U.S. adversaries operate. Integrated fires 
refers to the Navy’s use of cyberspace to exploit and attack this country’s adversaries’ 
vulnerabilities to achieve non-kinetic effects [9]. 
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Navy strategy for information dominance begins with the premise that 
information is a key enabler of mission success. Essentially, the military that can best 
sense, process, and deliver information will have the advantage in battle space awareness, 
C2, and decision making, which agrees with joint DOD guidance on information sharing 
and joint information systems. The DOD information sharing strategy identifies 
information as a force multiplier, capable of increasing operational effectiveness by 
increasing SA and improving C2 [10]. To that end, Joint Publication 6-0 asserts the 
importance of quality information in effective C2 and identifies seven key criteria of 
quality information as seen in Figure 1 [8]. 
 
Figure 1.  Quality Information Criteria, from [23] 
The DOD information sharing policy describes two key concepts that directly 
enhance information dominance, information mobility and the universal information 
sharing value chain. Information mobility is defined as “the dynamic availability of 
information, which is promoted by the business rules, information systems, architectures, 
standards, and guidance/policy to address the needs of both planned and unanticipated 
information sharing partners and events. Information mobility provides the foundation for 
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shared and user-defined situational awareness” [10]. The universal information sharing 
value chain serves as a framework that ensures information mobility and supports 
decision makers by implementing the discovery to decision continuum for data sharing. 
This model, displayed in Figure 2, is intended to “to discover and collect information and 
continuously add value at each stage to best inform a decision maker” [10]. 
 
Figure 2.  Discovery to Decision Continuum, from [10] 
Clearly, the DOD and the Navy agree that information is a key enabler of mission 
success and a force multiplier. Moreover, for information to provide the greatest impact 
to mission success, it must be derived from sources and systems that ensure information 
accuracy, timeliness, relevance, usability, completeness, brevity, and security. For 
decision makers to leverage this quality information fully, systems and procedures must 
support effective sharing and continuous improvement of information that is 
accomplished through information mobility and the perpetual use of the universal 
information sharing value chain. Using this framework, the result is an information 
advantage that allows decision makers who use information for one of two purposes, the 
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creation of shared SA for decision makers, and the direction and coordination in the 
execution of those decisions [8].  
By assisting in these decision-making functions, ever improving information, 
possessing key quality criteria, demonstrates operational value and creates information 
dominance. 
2. MIO Information Dominance through Wireless Biometric Data 
Sharing 
First, it must be stated that the wireless models of operation considered in this 
thesis are intended as additional capabilities for operators. Boarding team members in 
MIO settings, and other personnel engaged in identification and verification operations, 
will continue to maintain a local BEWL for specific missions and area of operations 
(AORs). This continuation provides redundancy in the case of connectivity loss, as well 
as flexibility in cases in which urgent requirements prefer the immediacy of a local 
BEWL over the accuracy and authority of DOD ABIS. However, operational advantages 
are clearly possible by connecting operators to authoritative databases. The thrust of this 
research assumes that connectivity to be the ultimate goal. 
By providing access to higher quality data on authoritative sources, such as ABIS, 
wireless operation for the operator directly contributes to identity dominance, which the 
Defense Forensics and Biometrics Agency (DFBA) defines as: 
The operational capability to achieve an advantage over an adversary by 
denying him the ability to mask his identity and/or to counter our 
biometric technologies and processes. This is accomplished through the 
use of enabling technologies and processes to establish the identity of an 
individual and to establish a knowledge base for that identity. This 
includes denying an adversary the ability to identify our protected assets. 
[11] 
Identify dominance, in action, continuously builds authoritative identity 
repositories, such as the DOD ABIS, and supplies operators and decision makers on the 
tactical edge with quality biometric information. Additionally, identity dominance 
supports assured C2 and promotes battlespace awareness; two of the three fundamental 
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capabilities of information dominance. In this way, identity dominance informs decision 
makers and is a vital subset of information dominance.  
Additionally, key components and characteristics of the wireless model for 
biometric data sharing directly address information quality criteria as defined by the 
DOD. As shown in Table 1, reach back to the DOD ABIS directly impacts each of the 
seven quality criteria. 
Table 1.   Impact to Quality Criteria 
Quality Criterion Benefit from Wireless Reach Back Biometric Operations 
Accuracy 
DOD ABIS is authoritative and constantly updated from valid 
DOD and interagency sources [11]. 
Relevance DOD ABIS is dedicated to DOD valued biometric data [11]. 
Timeliness 
ABIS Priority levels are set by operational mode and mission 
profile [33]. 
Usability 
DOD EBTS enrollment format was designed to ensure usable 
data in each enrollment [22]. 
Completeness DOD EBTS enrollment format ensures completeness [22]. 
Brevity DOD EBTS enrollment format forces brevity [22]. 
Security 
WR utilized integrated hardware cryptographic accelerator, 
FIPS 140-2 (Up to level 2), Suite B algorithms, tamper 
resistant hardware, AES-CTR-256 with SHA-512 HMAC, and 
Over the air re-keying [18], [19]. 
 
The proposed wireless model supports Navy strategy for information dominance 
in two ways. First, it expands the DOD’s ability to determine the disposition of forces 
that directly addresses the Navy’s strategy objective to ensure assured C2 as an integral 
piece of information dominance. Identification and verification operations carried out by 
MIO operators provide vital information about this nation’s adversaries. Connecting MIO 
decision makers and operators to a live authoritative database (ABIS) increases the 
quality of information available to them on the tactical edge. Moreover, as operators 
query ABIS, their inputs grow the ABIS database by providing previously undocumented 
enrollments, which increases the quality of biometric information resident on the 
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authoritative source. This mutual data sharing has a synergetic effect on the system and 
improves C2 capabilities for future operations. Secondly, this model, applied in a MIO 
setting, supports the Navy’s strategic goal to achieve battlespace awareness, by 
improving data sharing in the persistent monitoring of the maritime domain, and by way 
of identity dominance, extracting key knowledge about U.S. adversaries’ intent and 
operations. 
Wireless biometric data sharing offers opportunities for leveraging quality 
information to enable mission success. By connecting operators, the authoritative DOD 
ABIS using wireless reach back, DOD biometric repositories, and MIO personnel will 
benefit from improved data quality. Additionally, this wireless model supports the 
discovery to decision chain, which allows for continual improvement of information 
quality throughout the decision cycle. The model promotes assured C2 and improves 
battlespace awareness. Thus, the appropriate implementation of wireless biometric data 
sharing can improve mission success and help achieve information dominance in the 
maritime domain. 
H. TECHNICAL FOUNDATIONS  
The primary benefit to operators of the tactical wireless network is the flexibility 
and mobility provided by wireless functionality. Since 2004, CENETIX has 
experimented with various technologies, including ultra-wide band wireless, mesh 
networking, MANET, and others, to provide wireless communication to operators. The 
dynamic requirements-based nature of tactical wireless networks ensures the continued 
evolution of the tactical wireless models employed by CENETIX researchers. This 
section provides an in depth description of the particular technologies used for this 
research. 
1. 802.11X Wireless (Wi-Fi) 
Wireless local area network (WLAN) or Wi-Fi technology is incredibly common 
in industry and consumer electronics. The 802.11X, as outlined by the Institute of 
Electrical & Electronics Engineers (IEEE), originated in 1997 as a method to replace the 
costly physical infrastructure requirements of wired local area networks (LAN). The 
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wireless model made applying changes to LANs, such as additions and deletions, much 
more simple and affordable. In Wi-Fi, instead of data being transmitted over the physical 
wire, it is transmitted over radio frequency (RF) radio waves, on channels within the 2.4 
GHz or 5 GHz bands. The 2.4 GHz setting falls into the ultra high frequency (UHF) band 
and typically offers a greater range than the 5.0 GHz setting, which operates in the super 
high frequency (SHF) band and offers greater bandwidth [12]. 
Wi-Fi generally works in a point-to-multipoint (PMP) fashion, which extends the 
network to meet users’ needs. In this way, Wi-Fi offers great flexibility to connect many 
different types of devices, such as laptops and biometric scanners to a network or the 
Internet. The Wi-Fi standard also allows for point-to-point (P2P) connectivity to enable 
two Wi-Fi devices to communicate directly with one another. Wi-Fi operates in one of 
two modes. Sometimes, Wi-Fi operates in ad hoc mode as part of the independent basic 
service set (IBSS), which typically happens when services are unavailable or 
unnecessary, and underlying wireless infrastructure does not exist. More commonly, Wi-
Fi operates in infrastructure mode, where at least two wireless nodes connect to at least 
one wireless access point (WAP), which is referred to as the basic service set (BSS). Two 
or more BSS networks together form an extended service set (ESS) [12]. 
Wi-Fi is scalable and adaptable, which makes it suitable for integration with other 
technologies, such as WiMAX, wireless mesh, MANET, and others. Due to its relatively 
easy application in a variety of settings, Wi-Fi can be suitable for military purposes in 
some scenarios. For the purpose of this research, the term Wi-Fi refers to standard 
802.11X networks operating in infrastructure mode (BSS or ESS). The term wireless 
mesh refers to wireless networks operating in ad hoc mode (IBSS). The distinction is 
more thoroughly described in the following section. 
2. Wireless Mesh 
Wireless mesh networks (WMN) are a derivative of the lesser utilized ad hoc 
mode of the 802.11X wireless (or IBSS). WMNs eschew traditional Wi-Fi infrastructure, 
such as APs and routers, to create a flat and dynamic network of wireless nodes. WMNs 
provide an excellent alternative technology for last mile communications because each 
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node is not only a host, but also a router [13]. The nodes themselves are responsible for 
forwarding data packets and making routing decisions. Ultimately, the WMN connects to 
an Internet gateway in using a multi-hop scheme. WMNs are attractive alternatives 
because the technology is scalable, reliable, and relatively inexpensive to implement. As 
requirements increase, WMNs can be iteratively grown with additional nodes and 
gateways to meet the needs of users. 
While WMNs have their origins in ad hoc wireless networking, a bit of a 
distinction does exist between WMNs and ad hoc networks. As stated in [13], “The main 
difference between a WMN and an ad hoc network is perhaps the traffic pattern: in 
WMNs, practically all the traffic is either to or from a gateway; while in ad hoc networks, 
the traffic flows between arbitrary pairs of nodes.”  
Naturally, the minimalist approach to WMN implementation lends itself to 
military applications; especially in a maritime setting that lacks the infrastructure 
required for 802.11X Wi-Fi. For instance, operators can leverage WMN technology for 
reach-back during vessel boarding operations by simply deploying with lightweight and 
mobile WMN radios and devices. A backhaul path is necessary for desired reach back. In 
the WMN framework, it is simply a gateway and easily added to any WMN. Many 
options already provide this capability and are discussed in depth later. An instructive 
illustration of a basic mesh networks comes from Bosung et al. in [14]. 
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 Figure 3.  Typical WMN, from [14] 
3. Mobile Ad Hoc Networks  
MANET and WMN technology both stem from the original 802.11 standard, and 
not surprisingly, share many of the same qualities. However, the mobile nature of nodes 
on MANET systems creates a marked difference between common stationary WMNs and 
MANETs. MANETs are autonomous rapidly forming, self-healing, and self-organizing 
networks capable of dynamic routing and true peer-to-peer communication. According to 
the Internet engineering task force (IETF) request for comment (RFC) 2501, MANETs 
“have dynamic, sometimes rapidly-changing, random, multi-hop topologies which are 
likely composed of relatively bandwidth-constrained wireless links” [15]. 
Key distinctions about MANET are relevant in analyzing suitability for specific 
applications. As a subset of the broader concept of ad hoc networking, MANET is unique 
in that it is specifically deployed to allow constant communication between nodes on-the-
move. As asserted by Orwat et al., MANETs must be capable of two vital functions to 
accomplish this type of communication, decision making and optimization. MANETs are 
formed by individual mobile nodes capable of making decisions about themselves, 
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neighbor nodes, and the overall health and status of the network. Autonomous decision 
making compensates for the lack of traditional infrastructure. The decentralized decision 
making on a MANET absolutely depends on optimization. Nodes must be capable of 
making decisions based on optimality that protects and maintains the overall health of the 
network. Decision making and optimization is the key to the autonomous nature of 
MANETs. Nodes must be able to perform these vital operations to create a network 
capable of self-organizing and self-healing [16]. Figure 4 is a simple depiction of the ad 
hoc topology that characterized MANETs provided by Dean [17]. 
 
Figure 4.  Simple Mesh Autonomous Behavior  
MANET offers many benefits in an operational setting. Its decentralized nature, 
as well as its self-forming and dynamic routing capacities, reduces initial overhead and 
resource requirements. Fewer personnel are required to leverage MANET in forming 




4. Wave Relay  
WR™ radios are tactical radios designed and manufactured by Persistent 
Systems. WR radios are wireless OSI layer 2 devices designed to operate using 
proprietary onboard software, which is responsible for node decision making and network 
optimization. According to the manufacturer, the WR system was designed to “maintain 
connectivity among a large number of highly mobile nodes” [18].  
CENETIX researchers currently have access to two WR radio models that are 
especially applicable to maritime operations, the WR quad radio router and the manned 
portable unit generation 4 (MPU4). Field experiments conducted during this research 
utilized both radios to form the MANETs for testing, which will be discussed later in the 
text. Figure 5 provides a comparison on the quad radio and MPU4 using data compiled 



































































































140-2 L2   4 5 41 31.1 8-48 VDC 8W/55W
8.5 x 6 x 2 in
21.6 x 15.2 x 5.1 cm
3.2 lb / 1451.5 g
MPU4
140-2 L2   1 2 41 31.1 8-48 VDC 5 VDC Accesory
4.2W/16.5
W
7.8 x 3.0 x 1.5 in
19.8 x 7.6 x 3.2 cm
 
Figure 5.  Quad Radio and MPU4 Specification Comparison, from [18]–[20] 
In maritime experiment sites, the larger size and greater power of the quad radios 
are suitable for fixed mounting on large and small vessels, while the smaller and less 
powerful MPU4s provide mobile communications and network connectivity to boarding 
team members stationed on each vessel. 
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According to Persistent Systems, both radios: 
can be configured to function as an 802.11 access point. Standard clients 
such as laptops with built in 802.11 cards may access this system…For 
maximum performance, always disable the 802.11 AP unless it is 
required. To use a radio as a 802.11 Access Point, the radio must be set to 
a valid 802.11 frequency and the channel width must be set to 20 MHZ. 
[20] 
Despite WR’s 802.11 WAP capability, Persistent Systems does not recommend 
using Wi-Fi. The company recommends operating the WR radios in the proprietary 
MANET manner whenever possible. According to Persistent Systems Founder and CEO 
Herb Rubens, 
Connecting via Ethernet is absolutely the most efficient and secure means. 
WiFi wastes the spectrum on transmissions to your device which could 
have otherwise been used to support the network as a whole. The WiFi is 
also less secure. Our Fips 140-2 level 2 is for the MANET side, not the 
wifi side. We don’t have control over how security is implemented in the 
WiFi client of the SEEK device so we can’t certify that. [21] 
Accordingly, CENETIX researchers have operated the WR radio according to the 
manufacturer’s recommendations, and have always leveraged the WR MANET for data 
sharing over the CENETIX tactical network. Security is specifically addressed later in 
this chapter. 
I. CENETIX BIOMETRICS DATA SHARING FRAMEWORK 
CENETIX researchers collaborate with USCG, United States Navy (USN), San 
Francisco law enforcement, SOCOM, and a host of DOD and international partners on a 
variety of maritime field experiments. The CENETIX team partners with TRADOC 
capability manager biometrics and forensics team (TCM-BF) and USSOCOM to conduct 
biometrics training. TCM-BF provides field tested and authorized biometric sensors to 
CENETIX researchers. USSOCOM supports CENETIX research with training and by 
providing access to authoritative biometric databases for testing. 
Operators need three basic system requirements to obtain NRT analysis of 
biometric data collected in remote locations: (1) a device capable of collecting high-
quality and properly formatted biometric data, (2) a connected network capable of two-
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way real-time communication with an authoritative biometric database, and (3) an 
authoritative biometric database.  
The network requirement can be broken into two sub-requirements. Operators 
require a tactical network on the boarded vessel to provide communication and data 
sharing onboard amongst the team. For the purposes of the thesis, it is referred to as the 
tactical wireless network, or specifically as the WR MANET. To provide “last mile” 
communications, some form of wireless reach back network (WRN) is required. Both 
these network requirements are discussed in this chapter. 
For research and experimentation purposes, SEEK II serves as the biometric 
collection device; WR MANET serves as the tactical network; WRN is achieved using 
USCG satellite communications (SATCOM) during field experiments, and the identity 
operations SOFEX training portal serves as an authoritative database.  
Several alternative technologies exist to provide WRN and are examined in this 
chapter. Additionally, because SEEK II maintains the BEWL as an alternative to ABIS, a 
description of BEWL operation and procedures is included in this chapter. 
1. SEEK II 
The SEEK II is a mobile multi-modal biometrics collection device produced by 
Crossmatch Industries. While this thesis does not endorse specific vendors, the SEEK II 
is available to CENETIX researchers and authorized for biometric data transfer by the 
DOD. Army personnel at TCM-BF provide SEEK II devices and training to CENETIX 
researchers. The device captures and formats standards-based fingerprints, and iris and 
facial images, which conform to the DOD’s electronic biometric transmission 
specification (EBTS). This specification describes customizations of FBI electronic 
fingerprint transmission specification (EFTS) transactions, which are required to interface 
with the DOD ABIS. The SEEK II allows operators to create fingerprint, iris, and facial-
based biometric records and enroll those records in the ABIS system or to the locally 
stored BEWL [22].  
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The biometric scanner unit consists of two-finger optical fingerprint plates and 
dual iris scan and facial image sensor camera. It has two USB 2.0 host connections and 
one Ethernet port. SEEK devices currently operate on Microsoft Windows XP SP3 and 
the 32 bit version of Windows 7. Onboard memory is capped at two gigabytes of 
dynamic random access memory (DRAM), and the removable hard disk drive (HDD) has 
a capacity of 64 gigabytes. Although SEEK II is not currently authorized to operate 
wirelessly under its authority to operate (ATO) [23], SEEK II supports 802.11 b or g 
wireless, and supports 802.11 Bluetooth as well. Additionally, the device has embedded 
Global Positioning System (GPS) technology and supports 3G connectivity, which 
expands its operational versatility.  
The device is significantly ruggedized to support tactical use. The dual batteries 
are hot swappable. The touchscreen display and keyboard are damage resistant and 
designed for visibility during bright daylight and dark conditions. The onboard 
microphone performs noise canceling for voice capture. It is capable of storing an on-
board BEWL of up to 120,000 enrollments, which can be queried by the user to provide 
match-no match responses for new enrollments [24]. 
 
Figure 6.  SEEK II by Crossmatch Technologies, from [24] 
 21 
2. Tactical Network and WRN 
As discussed earlier, the WR Quad and MPU4 radios operate as Layer 2 MANET, 
and form the core of the CENETIX tactical wireless network during field experiments. 
WR utilizes its proprietary routing algorithms to provide wireless connectivity between 
other WR nodes on the tactical network. WR nodes provide tactical network connectivity 
to the SEEK II via a direct Ethernet connection or by providing an 802.11 WAP [18], 
[19]. All communication and data sharing occurring on the boarded vessel happens over 
the WR MANET. 
The WRN is responsible for reach back, or connectivity beyond the boarded 
vessel that is sometimes referred to as “last mile” communications. WRN can be provided 
many ways. Some examples are: 
a. Shipboard SATCOM 
In a typical VBSS scenario, the boarding team is launched from a larger naval 
vessel that encompasses organic SATCOM resources. For example, the vast majority of 
U.S. Navy vessels are equipped with an automated digital network system (ADNS), and a 
shipboard router that can route data over the several different SATCOM paths. ADNS 
Increment III, and newer, allows units to transport data over commercial broadband 
satellite program (CBSP) SATCOM l or defense satellite communications (DSCS) 
SATCOM. Data is transferred from the ADNS router, through the space segment, to 
Navy teleport sites [25]. These sites function as Internet service providers (ISP) and can 
provide access to the Internet. Connecting the tactical MANET to ADNS for WRN 
provides access to the identity operations SOFEX portal or to the DOD ABIS portal. In 
MIO related VBSS missions, shipboard SATCOM is the most common form of reach 
back, and most desirable due to its speed and reliability. As with any DOD information 
system, information assurance can be a concern. Connecting to a DOD ADNS router 
requires appropriate authority to connect and operate. 
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b. Commercial off-the-Shelf Global Satellite  
Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) Global Satellite products are available to 
provide remote operators to SATCOM without access to traditional SATCOM. Two 
products, in particular, have been used in previous CENETIX testing and are suitable for 
MIO and VBSS applications. A broadband global area network (BGAN) terminal is a 
satellite earth terminal manufactured and operated by Inmarsat. Additionally, very-small-
aperture terminals (VSAT) are available from multiple vendors and service providers 
[26]. Generally speaking, BGAN is lightweight and more mobile than VSAT but offers 
lower bandwidth.  
BGAN and VSAT both provide sufficient bandwidth to support biometric data 
sharing in MIO. Ultimately, the choice is between the greater mobility of BGAN and the 
superior bandwidth offered by VSAT. As stated by Antillon in [27], both products 
depend on line of sight (LOS), which should be considered when operators determine 
their location on the boarded vessel. Antillon provides a good comparison between 
VSAT and BGAN specifications in his work on hastily formed networks in [27]. 
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 Figure 7.  BGAN versus VSAT, from [27] 
c. 3G/4G 
In recent CENETIX experiments, 3G and 4G cellular networks have proven 
successful in providing reach back to the CENETIX Command and Control Center in 
Monterey, CA. Bordetsky explains in [28] that in field experiments from 2008 and 
onward, CENETIX has successfully used 3G and 4G cellular service from various 
providers to provide redundancy to commercial and DOD SATCOM for MIO field 
experiments in San Francisco Bay and at international sites. Various forms of data 
collected during CENETIX RSE demonstrations has been shared successfully using 3G 
and 4G. These devices can provide a Wi-Fi hotspot or WAP to nodes on the tactical 
network. Obviously, MIO operators in remote locations typically cannot access 
commercial cellular services, but 3G and 4G technology can be feasible as a reach back 
tool in urban environments, such as major ports and harbors [29].  
Using open or shared Internet from cellular service introduces security concerns. 
Virtual private networks (VPN) can be used to harden the reach back circuit and 
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significantly counter cyber security risks to biometric data sharing. VPN integration to 
the WRN is addressed later in this chapter.  
d. ISP 
In some cases, direct access to an ISP is possible. During CENETIX field 
experiments in the San Francisco Bay, the USCG station on Yerba Buena Island provided 
access to the open Internet through a commercial ISP. Although not likely in most MIO 
or VBSS situations, like 3G and 4G, a commercial ISP may be an option in more urban 
environments. This option may also require the use of VPN to harden the WRN 
sufficiently. 
3. DOD Automated Biometric Identification System 
ABIS is a “generic term for any automated biometric identification system.” [30] 
The DOD ABIS serves specific defense oriented biometric needs. Its original design was 
based on the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Integrated Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System. DOD ABIS encompasses and electronic database and all related 
applications and tools to provide storage, retrieval, and queries of fingerprints and other 
biometric data that has been collected on persons of interest to national security [30]. The 
current iteration of this system is labeled Next Generation NG-ABIS, but is still generally 
referred to as simply DOD ABIS. According to the U.S. Army’s biometrics enabling 
capabilities (BEC) branch of program executive office (PEO) for enterprise information 
systems, in [31], DOD ABIS is: 
The central, authoritative, multi-modal biometric data repository. It is the 
enterprise-level authoritative data source for DOD biometrics. NG-ABIS 
expands capabilities with multi-modal (fingerprint, palm, iris, face) 
storage and matching, watch list capability, and improved integration with 
interagency repositories. It is based on adaptations of COTS products, 
using open architecture to minimize development and speed deployment. 
The system takes advantage of low-risk, cost-effective blade hardware to 
optimize system availability and scalability, and ensure continuity of 
operations. NG-ABIS interfaces with numerous DOD and interagency 
biometrics systems, including the FBI Integrated Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System (IAFIS), and the Department of Homeland Security 
IDENT System, storing and matching biometric data on persons of interest 
to DOD. 
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According to [32], Version 1.2 of ABIS utilizes improved algorithms to reduce 
inconclusive returns and provide faster matching than previous iterations. It handles 
between 30,000 and 45,000 transactions per day and provides continuous BEWL 
availability to DOD customers. ABIS storage capacity is currently 18 million records, 
and is scalable to 48 million records. It has a robust and comprehensive continuity of 
operation plan (COOP) that includes a fully capable master recovery system. 
Biometric files interfacing with DOD ABIS must be compliant with DOD 
electronic biometric transmission specification (EBTS) version 3.0. Earlier versions of 
this standard focused primarily on fingerprints, but the expanding role of biometrics in a 
broader range of DOD operations required greater biometric capabilities. EBTS v2 and 
EBTS v3 greatly increased the scope of the EBTS standard to include search ability for 
iris scan and facial recognition images, as well as DNA samples [28].  
Operators can connect to ABIS through an existing web portal. The SEEK II is 
authorized to access ABIS via hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) or secure HTTP 
(HTTPS) [33]. Currently, operating operator queries to the DOD ABIS are prioritized 
into four categories determined by the operational mode summary and mission profile.1 
Priority one is highest and carries a maximum response time of 15 minutes. Category two 
receives responses within 30 minutes; category 3 within 60 minutes; and category 4 
within four hours [33]. 
 
1 According the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), An operational mode 
summary/mission profile (OMS/MP) is a time-phased representation of planned operations at the tasks, 
conditions, and standards level across the range of military operations. The regulation governing 
development of OMS/MPs is TRADOC Regulation 71-20, Concept Development, Capabilities 
Determination, and Capabilities Integration.” In the context of biometric operations, the OMS/MP of an 
organization conducting biometric operations determines their priority to the DoD ABIS. Generally, 
priority 1 is reserved for special operations missions. Depending on the mission, MIO could fall into any of 




                                                 
4. Biometrically Enabled Watch List 
The term biometrically enabled watch list (BEWL) refers to any list of persons of 
national interest (POI) that identifies those persons with biometric characteristics [30]. In 
addition to providing a true biometric identity for POIs, the BEWL also describes known 
dispositions or assessments on POI status, which aide decision makers in determining 
appropriate actions for operators interacting with these individuals. A comprehensive 
DOD BEWL exists within the larger DOD ABIS, but it is too large to be held on existing 
mobile devices like the SEEK II. This storage limitation is resolved by the creation of 
smaller BEWLs tailored to AOR or mission specific requirements. These smaller BEWLs 
can be loaded onto biometric devices to provide immediate responses for operators 
engaged in MIO or in ground-based identification and verification operations [33]. For 
example, the Global War on Terror resulted in an incredible dependence on the DOD’s 
Afghanistan BEWL, which contains only roughly 0.5% of the biometric enrollments of 
the larger DOD ABIS [34]. 
5. ABIS versus BEWL 
As previously stated, the SEEK II is capable of maintaining an integrated BEWL 
with up to 120,000 enrollments (250,000 in newer models of the same device). 
Obviously, this number is far smaller than the much larger authoritative DOD ABIS 
database, and can result in less accurate information on the tactical edge for operators and 
decision makers. However, because the BEWL is stored on the SEEK II device, 
biometric responses are immediate. 
The convenience of a locally stored BEWL on SEEK II offers obvious benefits to 
timeliness. However, BEWL creation, promulgation, and updating occur periodically, 
which creates a potential for diminished relevance and accuracy of biometric data 
available to operators. According to tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) in [33], 
commanders of units conducting biometric operations are encouraged to ensure BEWL 
updates are checked daily, but the minimum requirement for BEWL updates is weekly.  
Considering the significant number of systems feeding the DOD ABIS and the 
sheer volume of available biometric data, even a 24-hour lapse in synchronization 
 27 
(between local BEWL and DOD ABIS) could have a negative impact on the quality of 
biometric data. For example, a biometric enrollment from Afghanistan could be of 
importance to a biometric search being conducted in another AOR within the 
recommended 24-hour update period. Clearly, even this daily update could miss 
important information in the new enrollment. If only the weekly updates are performed, 
the data synchronization problem is exacerbated. Moreover, these problems are evident in 
the best-case scenario, where operators have consistent access to biometric repositories. 
Deployed operators may be forced to extend beyond weekly updates in some operational 
environments.  
Fortunately, available technology is capable of addressing this issue. The multi-
modal SEEK II provides ample biometric collection capability; supporting fingerprints, 
facial recognition, and iris scanning, which are all supported by DOD ABIS and the DOD 
EBTS standard. More to the point, the SEEK II already includes multiple interfaces that 
support network connectivity, including, USB, Ethernet, Bluetooth, and Wi-Fi, which 
could be used at the tactical edge to achieve NRT biometric responses. However, these 
capabilities often go unused. Remote operators can lack on-site connectivity, which 
requires them to rely solely on the local BEWL. In the case of wireless reach back, the 
current ATO approves only wired Ethernet connections. 
J. SECURITY 
Cyber security is of particular concern during data sharing in identification and 
verification operations. Biometric data are generally considered unclassified but sensitive 
that require the protection for confidentiality and integrity of the data. However, wireless 
networks, such as those deployed by CENETIX, automatically accept certain risks 
associated with wireless operation. The two proposed wireless models operate in different 
ways and include their own specific security implications. The primary cyber security 
concern for the tactical network is the manner in which each model handles the security 
of data-in-transit between the SEEK II device and the WR MANET. WR encryption 
throughout the MANET complies with federal information processing standard (FIPS) 
 28 
140-2. Wireless operation between the SEEK II and the WR WAP relies on non-
proprietary encryption schemes [3], [36]. 
1. FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules 
Cryptographic products that operate in a sensitive but unclassified environment 
must meet the specifications listed in FIPS 140-2. This federal standard is based on the 
broader National Institute of Standards and Technology FIPS 140 standard. FIPS 140-2 
outlines requirements and standards for cryptographic modules, including hardware and 
software components, to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of information, which 
is processed by the cryptographic module. 
FIPS 140-2 defines four security levels—level 1 through level 4. Level one offers 
the lowest level of security and level four offers the highest. The requirements for each 
level address areas of concern for design and implementation of cryptographic functions 
within the module. The areas of concern include: 
Cryptographic module specification; module ports and interfaces; roles, 
services, and authentication; finite state model; physical security; 
operational environment; cryptographic key management; electromagnetic 
interference/electromagnetic compatibility (EMI/EMC); self-tests; and 
design assurance. [36] 
Figure 8 provides a summary of the requirements for each of the four security 
levels specified by FIPS 140-2. 
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 Figure 8.  Summary of FIPS 104-2 Security Requirements by Level, from [36] 
2. Wave Relay FIPS 140-2 Compliance 
Throughout this research related field experiments, WR radios have been used to 
transmit data wirelessly on the tactical network in two ways, the proprietary WR 
MANET and 802.11 Wi-Fi. Wireless MANET operation is FIPS 140-2 compliant. As 
stated previously, 802.11 Wi-Fi operation on WR radios is not FIPS 140-2 approved.  
a. Wave Relay MANET FIPS 140-2 Compliance  
WR radios—quad radios and MPUs—are validated by the governments of the 
United States and Canada as compliant with FIPS 140-2. The radio’s encryption scheme 
relies on National Security Agency approved Suite B algorithms, specifically, counter 
mode advanced encryption standard (AES) encryption with a secure hash algorithm 2 
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(SHA-2) 512 bit hash-based message authentication code (CTR-AES-256 HMAC-SHA-
512). The non-proprietary security policy, which is kept on file by NIST.gov, states that 
in addition to CTR mode, WR can also use CBC and GCM modes. While Persistent 
Systems defaults to a 256-bit key, WR radios can also use 128 and 192 bit keys for 
encryption and decryption of network traffic [36]. 
In addition to the security provided by FIPS Level 1 requirements, FIPS Level 2 
provides additional physical security by requiring tamper-proof evidence on the 
cryptographic module itself or its container to protect the module’s plaintext 
cryptographic keys, as well as the critical security parameters. WR’s ruggedized form 
factor meets this requirement. Level 2 also requires role-based authentication for 
operators on the cryptographic module [35]. According to [36], WR meets this 
specification by implementing web browser access to module management functions over 
HTTP/TLS. The interface supports three roles: crypto officer, network management, and 
user. Roles are authorized to execute appropriate functions IAW with FIPS 140-2. In this 
way, FIPS 140-2 accreditation allows WR MANETs to implement the cyber security 
concepts of “least privilege” and “separation of duties.” 
However, the FIPS 140-2 accreditation for WR only applies to the cryptographic 
boundary for each radio. In [36], Persistent Systems defines those boundaries: 
For the MPU3S, MPU3D, MPU4, and QRS, the physical cryptographic 
boundary is defined as the module case, which includes the Wave Relay 
main board, including the hardware cryptographic accelerator chip, 
drivers, CPU, and on-board flash memory. The boundary does not include 
any port caps. 
According to the manufacturer, the 802.11 WAP is available during the FIPS 
mode of operation, but the WAP and the device accessing the WAP is not FIPS 140-2 
compliant [36]. In other words, only MANET operation of the WR tactical network is 
FIPS 140-2 compliant.  
b. Cipher WR 802.11 WAP FIPS 140-2 Compliance  
WR quad radios and MPU4 utilize only Wi-Fi protected access 2-pre-shared key 
(WPA2-PSK) for securing their WAP. The radios use AES-128 with cipher block 
 31 
chaining, message authentication code (CBC-MAC)[36]. As stated earlier, encryption 
functions related to the 802.11 WAP fall outside of the cryptographic boundary of WR 
radios and are not FIPS 140-2 approved. 
The Crossmatch SEEK II biometric device operates on Windows XP SP 3, which 
supports WPA-2-PSK, as does the SEEK II onboard wireless adapter [24]. The SEEK II 
can communicate wirelessly, at some level of security, with quad radio or MPU4 over the 
WAP. However, WR’s FIPS 140-2 accreditation does not apply to this mode of operation 
[36]. 
3. VPN 
As stated previously, commercial services can sometimes be leveraged to provide 
reach back from the tactical network to ABIS. Using open or public Internet can be 
convenient and efficient, but it places data in transit at risk, and makes it vulnerable to a 
host of cyber threats. A relatively simple countermeasure, which provides significant 
reduction in cyber threats, is a VPN. 
Determining a specific definition for VPN can be difficult due to the range of 
diversity in capabilities by VPN manufacturers. Despite the many differences in 
commercial VPNs, some commonalities and core capabilities exist to help define VPN 
technology. Put simply, a VPN is an established connection over an existing public or 
shared network infrastructure that implements encryption and authentication technologies 
to secure payload data in transit between two nodes or endpoints not directly connected 
[37]. An effective VPN should execute cryptographic functions, such as encrypting, 
hashing, shared keys, and digital certificates, to protect against cyber threats, such as 
eavesdropping, packet tampering, man-in-the-middle attacks, and replay attacks [38]. 
Properly implemented, a VPN provides substantial protection to the confidentiality and 
integrity of data being shared between two points. 
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II. CENETIX EXPERIMENTS IN A MIO SETTING 
To maximize operational benefits from wireless biometric data sharing and reach 
back over the CENETIX tactical network, efforts were made to measure baseline 
performance of the network, identify network inefficiencies, and develop 
recommendations for network optimization. For the purposes of this thesis, optimization 
efforts addressed two areas of the CENETIX network, the WR MANET itself and the 
integration of wireless operation of the SEEK II on the MANET. 
As previously stated in Chapter II, WR tactical radios form the MANET portion 
of the tactical network. Baseline performance data is difficult to ascertain due to the 
dynamic (on a per-packet, sub second basis) and self-forming nature of MANETs. The 
proprietary nature of the WR routing algorithm is another challenge in accurately 
predicting tactical network behavior. Despite these challenges, many characteristics of 
the network and its components offer measurable data and clearly stated specifications, 
which can be used to form evidence-based recommendations for optimizing the tactical 
network.  
This chapter provides the details of two experiments. The first experiment 
addressed the optimization of the CENETIX wireless MANET for MIO scenarios in the 
San Francisco Bay. The second experiment used outcomes from the first experiment to 
improve MANET performance in preparation for wireless integration of the SEEK II 
biometric device. During the second experiment, the improved CENETIX wireless 
MANET was used to conduct biometric data sharing using two models of wireless 
operation. Data was collected on the performance of both models to inform a comparative 




A. NPS MIO WMD ISR EXPERIMENT, AUGUST 2014: OPTIMIZING THE 
WAVE RELAY MANET 
In August 2014, CENETIX researchers joined with USCG boarding teams, as 
well as USCG Research & Development Center in Alameda, California to conduct the 
Semi-Annual Tactical Network Test Bed, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Intelligence 
Surveillance And Reconnaissance (TNT WMD ISR) event. Researchers intended to 
demonstrate and measure capabilities of the CENETIX tactical network, as well as a 
range of sensors and emerging peripheral technologies, within a MIO setting. 
Key portions of the MIO experiment occurred onboard the vessel GTS Adm. 
Callaghan (AK-1001), which served as the experiment’s boarded vessel. Testing focused 
on boarding team communication over the tactical network, as well as reach back to 
remote C2 stations. For the purposes of this experiment, a communications station 
located on Yerba Buena Island (YBI) operated as a remote C2 station. Small USCG 
Auxiliary and San Francisco police department (SFPD) vessels served as relay nodes 
between the boarded vessel and C2 station on YBI. Boarding team members were 
equipped with WR and TrellisWare mobile tactical radios during common boarding 
operations, such as sensitive site exploitation (SSE) and RSE. All stations (vessels and 
YBI) were equipped with a WR quad radio operating on the 5.8 GHz band. 
Boarding team communication within internal compartments on the boarded 
vessel occurred over TrellisWare radios. Previous testing, as well as indications in the 
set-up phase of this scenario, indicated the lower frequency TrellisWare radios performed 
better inside of the “skin of the ship.” WR radios on the exterior of the ship were utilized 
for exterior boarding team communication and reach back or “last mile” communication 
to the remote station at YBI. Ongoing CENETIX research efforts regarding the wireless 
transfer of biometric data to remote C2 cells rely on efficient and reliable “last mile” 
communications. Therefore, optimization of the “topside” WR MANET is a key concern. 
Baselining this network, and efforts to approach optimal performance of the wireless 
MANET, were intended to assist in best implementing the CENETIX tactical network in 
future field experiments for wirelessly sharing biometric data. 
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CENETIX researchers and members of the USCG Research and Development 
Center were asked to monitor, capture, and analyze network performance, which included 
physical site survey, throughput measurement using the Solar Winds software, and 
monitoring the WR network management interface. Observations and data collection 
from this experiment informed some basic hardware, setup, and configuration 
requirements for CENETIX researchers in later experiments dedicated to wirelessly 
sharing biometric data. Feedback and analysis was provided by all team members in the 
form of after action reports (AAR). Feedback was compiled and analyzed at the 
CENETIX laboratory in Monterey to conduct a comprehensive analysis on MANET 
performance. Researchers consistently observed inefficiencies as a result of antenna 
selection and radio configuration and characteristics. 
1. Antenna Selection 
WR quad radios, located on each vessel, utilized a 360° Sector Array (operating 
as omnidirectional) antenna, with an 8 dBi gain (standard Persistent Systems WR model). 
Locations of quad radio relay nodes on small vessels were effectively static throughout 
the experiment. Intermittent connectivity and inadequate data rates indicated that link 
quality was poor throughout the MIO boarding scenario, which reduced the operators’ 
and researchers’ ability to transmit data over the network. Specifically, link outages and 
suboptimal data rates (below 1 Mbps) prevented operators from efficiently transmitting 
data over the network [39]. 
Based on the static nature of the relay vessels, USCG Research & Development 
Center feedback recommended implementing a higher gain directional antenna on the 
boarded vessel and training it on the relatively static nearest afloat relay node. This 
relatively simple, but significant, modification would better suit CENETIX research for 
the specific MIO application. By increasing directivity, it is possible to concentrate the 
signal on the approximate location of relay node. Moreover, increasing the gain 
(measured in dBi or decibel isotropic), the reception cone is narrowed and the effective 
range of the antenna is increased and signal quality is improved.  
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In addressing the range issue between afloat nodes, the “6 dB rule” is a good rule 
of thumb in planning future experiments. As explained by M. F. Young in his 
contribution to the FCC outreach program [40], “every time you double (or halve) the 
distance from the transmitter to the receiver, the signal level is lowered (or increased) by 
6 dB.” Additionally, narrowing the cone beam from the antenna decreases interference, 
which reduces noise to improve link quality. Thus, simply selecting a higher gain 
directional antenna can significantly increase the effective range from the boarded vessel 
and result in substantial improvements to the signal to noise ratio (SNR). Chapter IV 
includes further analysis of these concepts. 
CENETIX researchers agreed with this assessment. As a result, students planned 
to test static directional antennas in future experiments, and intended to optimize antenna 
selection for MIO scenarios similar to those conducted in the San Francisco Bay. 
Moreover, this observation correlates with Bordetsky’s and Bourakav’s research 
regarding network on target (NoT), which proved the effectiveness of antenna directivity 
in self-aligning orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (SAOFDM) in providing a 
ship-to-shore tactical link capable of providing up to 5 Mbps throughput in similar MIO 
conditions [29].  
To note some distinctions, that tactical link utilized radios operating at 900 MHz, 
and the directionality of the antennae was an automatic function of the selected 
algorithm. However, the research does indicate that tactical network performance can be 
improved using directional antennae. Furthermore, it shows that speeds of up to 5 Mbps 
are possible in a virtually identical maritime setting. Data rates during the August 
CENETIX experiment did not exceed 2.58 Mbps. SNR on the tactical link remained at 
approximately 39 dB. Increased noise and interference, as a result of the suboptimal 




2. Radio Selection 
WR MPU4 radios come from the manufacturer with specific frequency and power 
capabilities. WR-RAD-03 radios selected for this experiment operated in the 2312-2507 
MHz frequency range at 600 mW output power. This selection was suboptimal for the 
following two reasons. 
First, as evidenced by Adnen in [41], lower frequency radios suffer less loss due 
to attenuation, and typically perform better than higher frequency radios in shipboard 
settings. The lower frequency signal more successfully penetrates ship bulkheads and 
provides greater resilience to varying maritime environmental conditions. CENETIX 
researchers discovered in this same experiment that the TrellisWare tactical radios 
outperformed the WR radios, especially inside the skin of the ship. The TrellisWare 
radios were operating in the 1410–1460 MHz frequency range, and proved to be more 
capable of transmitting through bulkheads onboard the boarded vessel. The benefits of 
lower frequency were also evident on the exterior portions of the ship where 
superstructure and other components of the vessel existed as barriers to line of site. 
Persistent Systems currently produces suitable WR tactical radios capable of operating at 
a lower frequency, which should be more resilient to the problems of signal absorption, 
dispersion, and interference common in a shipboard environment. 
Secondly, as evidenced by Zhang in [42], the maximum output power for the 
WR-RAD-03 for is 600 mW. Generally, it is understood that increased power can 
increase range. In the context of the WR MANET, it should be noted that optimal power 
settings on a per-packet basis is desirable. Presumably, it is a function of the proprietary 
WR onboard software. For the purposes of this experiment, it is accepted that increasing 
the maximum available output power only increases the network’s ability to maximize 
throughput. WR offers radios capable of 2 W maximum output power. However, at 
present, the 2 W variant of the MPU4 operates at the same frequency range of the WR-
RAD-03 (2312–2507 MHz). Persistent Systems provides Table 2, which illustrates radio 
output power specifications [19]. While the MPU4 offered superior performance outside 
the skin of the ship, an optimal radio selection should consider frequency and power in 
the context of the specific application. Optimal radio choice should provide a range of 
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frequency and power settings to meet specific operational requirements and 
environmental realities. In this case, it would be desirable to select a radio that performs 
well inside the skin of the ship and externally.  
Table 2.   Wave Relay Frequency and Range Specifications, from [19] 
 FREQUENCY 
WR Pin # 
 
 
WR Frequency Range 
 
 
WR Output Power 
 WR-RAD-02 907–922 MHz 28dBm/600mW 
 WR-RAD-03 2312–2507 MHz 28dBm/600mW 
 WR-RAD-04 2412–2462 MHz 28dBm/600mW 
 WR-RAD-09 5180–5320, 5500–5700, 5745–5825 MHz 28dBm/600mW 
 WR-RAD-12 2312–2507 MHz 33dBm/2W 
 WR-RAD-14 1352–1387 MHz 27dBm/500mW 
 WR-RAD-15 4400–4800 MHz 25dBm/320mW 
 WR-RAD-16 4800–4985 MHz 26dBm/400mW 
 
Additionally, the quad radio is capable of operating in 5.8 GHz or 2.4 GHz bands. 
Although the 5.8 GHz band was suitable for this field experiment, the option provides 
optimization choices under different circumstances. 
3. Channel Bandwidth 
WR quad radios can be configured for channel widths of 5 MHz, 10 MHz, 20 
MHz, or 40 MHz [18], [19]. MPU4 radios do not support 40 MHz channel width. As a 
result, the 20 MHz channel width selection was in place throughout the August MIO 
experiment. Using the 20 MHz channel width setting, researchers expected to maximize 
data rates over the tactical network. However, the 20 MHz setting introduces a greater 
opportunity for noise on the channel, which can result in a decreased SNR and negatively 
impact receiver sensitivity. Increased noise on the channel may also increase the error 
rate on the network, which reduces the overall success of packet transmission and 
degrades link quality. Network latency and reduced data rates observed during the 
August MIO experiment may have been, in part, due to the 20 MHz bandwidth setting. If 
the network is otherwise optimized, lowering the channel width setting is one way to 
lower error rate and improve link quality. Additionally, reducing the WR channel width 
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setting to 10 Mhz or 5 Mhz effectively reduces the noise on the channel without reducing 
signal strength. The tradeoff decision between the higher data rate of the 20 MHz channel 
width or the improved link quality of 5 or 10 MHz channel width setting must also 
consider environmental factors and operational objectives. In this particular case, 
reducing the channel width to improve link quality may have been prudent. 
Optimization of “last mile” communications via the WR MANET tactical 
network is crucial to providing operational value to personnel engaged in MIO and 
executing biometric identification operations. Key considerations for optimizing the 
tactical network should be increased range, reduced latency, minimized error rate, and 
sufficient throughput or data rates. Based on evidence and observations resulting from the 
August TNT WMD ISR event, CENETIX researchers recommended the following 
changes to the WR MANET. 
• Implement directional high gain antennae on the boarding vessel.  
• Select radios with sufficient output power. 2 Watt WR models are 
recommended. 
• Select radios capable of lower frequency operation 
• Select channel width setting lower than 20 MHz. 10 Mhz is recommended. 
(a constraint of the MPU4 capabilities, which requires that the 20 MHz 
channel width be selected to support 802.11 WAP) 
B. NPS BIOMETRIC EXPERIMENT, OCTOBER 2014: CONDUCTING 
IDENTIFICATION OPERATIONS USING REACH BACK  
On October 3, 2014, CENETIX researchers traveled to Alameda, California to 
conduct research onboard the Military Sealift Command vessel GTS Admiral W. M. 
Callaghan and at YBI. Building on previous CENETIX TNT research, students 
constructed a wireless MANET to test wireless reach-back capabilities for biometric data 
sharing.  
Past CENETIX research had demonstrated the evolving and significant 
capabilities of wireless MANET in a maritime setting using WR and TrellisWare radios 
to provide SA, C2, and information sharing. In August 2014, the CENETIX team 
conducted a large-scale experiment in Alameda in cooperation with the USCG, Joint 
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Interagency Field Experimentation (JIFX), SFPD, and various other partners. The 
experiment focused on CBRN SSE, detection and reporting, and had great success in 
proving new applications of tactical wireless networks, networks on-the-move, unmanned 
ground vehicle (UGV) integration, submerged human diver networks, and a host of 
emerging technologies. Additionally, feedback from CENETIX students, the USCG 
Research and Development Center, and other research partners, provided 
recommendations for optimizing the tactical network for future MIO scenarios [39], [43].  
During the August experiment, this research was focused on identifying methods 
to improve performance of WR MANET. Feedback from the August experiment 
provided researchers with recommendations for improving the tactical network. To the 
extent possible, those recommendations were followed during this experiment. However, 
the primary aim of this experiment was to conduct biometric data sharing wirelessly—
using two proposed methods—and collecting data about network performance during 
wireless operation.  
Accordingly, the scope of the experiment on October 3, 2014 was narrowly 
focused on biometric data sharing over the CENETIX tactical network. The specific goal 
was to transmit and receive biometric data wirelessly from the SEEK II through the WR 
MANET to the CENETIX server and the SOFEX Internet portal using two proposed 
wireless models: MPU4 as an 802.11 WAP, and MPU4 tethered via Ethernet to a SEEK 
II. The NPS server was used for data collection and collaboration, and the SOFEX portal 
provided NRT analysis and response for biometric data. 
1. Concept of Operations  
The following list outlines the CONOP for the CENETIX biometric reach back 
experiment. 
• Rapidly deploy the MANET in a manner consistent with USN and USCG 
boarding team operations. 
• Setup and configure two wireless models for SEEK II connectivity. 
• Enable WAP on MPU4 and connect the SEEK II wirelessly to MPU4 
WAP. 
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• Tether the SEEK II to the MPU4 with an Ethernet cable. (For this 
research, a tethered device allows operator mobility as one wireless 
device) 
• Test connectivity to the CENETIX server. 
• Test connectivity to the SOFEX biometric portal located at 
http://sofex.identityops.com/UserLogin.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2fdefault.aspx . 
• Measure network performance using Solar Winds application to determine 
baseline. 
• Apply antenna recommendations for network optimization from August 
2014 TNT MIO experiment. 
• Conduct mock RSE; specifically biometric data collection. Capture role-
player mock biometric data including finger prints, iris scans, and facial 
recognition photos. (MOC training files) 
• Enroll mock biometrics to the biometric application on the SEEK II. 
• Send biometric data to the CENETIX server using both wireless models. 
• Upload enrollments to the SOFEX portal for “match or no-match” using 
both wireless models. 
• Collect data concerning network performance during the testing of both 
wireless models. 
• Log activity throughout on the CENETIX server’s observer’s notepad. 
2. Scenario and Network Design 
The GTS Admiral W. M. Callaghan (Figure 9) platform was used to simulate a 
boarded vessel. Coast Guard facilities on YBI served as the remote C2 station, which 
provided ultimate reach back for the tactical network. The SFPD provided the patrol 
vessel MARINE 7, and the Coast Guard Auxiliary provided a small support vessel. These 
vessels served as afloat relays. 
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 Figure 9.  GTS Admiral W. M. Callaghan 
The tactical network was constructed using a wireless MANET consisting of four 
WR quad radios and one MPU4. Additional devices were added as nodes including 
laptop computers and a SEEK II biometric collection device. The boarded vessel was 
outfitted with one WR quad radio, which was installed on the ship’s superstructure, two 
decks above the main deck. A Windows laptop, including the Solar Winds application, 
was connected to the Quad Radio with a wired Ethernet connection for network 
performance monitoring. Additionally, one MPU4 was deployed onboard, and it 
connected wirelessly to the Quad Radio over the 2.4 GHz UHF band. The WAP was 
enabled on the MPU4 for 802.11 SEEK II Wi-Fi operations. Alternatively, the MPU4 
provided tethered connectivity for the mobile SEEK II operation. The two relay vessels 
were also equipped with quad radios, and the C2 cell on YBI had an installed WR quad 
radio operating on the 5.8 GHz band. 
At YBI, the CENETIX network connected to a router that supplied VPN access to 
the CENETIX server located in Monterey, California, or by way of a static route, to the 
Internet for accessing the SOFEX biometrics portal. The static route was an addition to 
previous iterations of the CENETIX tactical network. To address security, the CENETIX 
team implemented a VPN as the only option for remote access to the CENETIX server. 
In addition to added security for the CENETIX infrastructure, this modification also 
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provides a useful simulation in connecting operators securely to a protected network. See 
Figure 10. 
 






3. Experiment Execution 
The first task was network installation and configuration. All nodes were 
configured and tested successfully at the CENETIX lab in Monterey, California, but 
required on-site verification of network operation. The MANET operated properly 
immediately upon installation. To verify this operation, and determine baseline 
measurements, students conducted ping tests and sent data across the MANET. 
Measurements were conducted using Solar Winds and the Windows command prompt. 
Students on the boarded vessel used the SEEK II to collect biometrics including 
fingerprints, iris scans, and facial recognition photos. 
Following system setup and baseline measurements, initial attempts to transfer 
biometric data wirelessly over the MANET and to the SOFEX Portal failed. 
Troubleshooting efforts suggested the SEEK II was the faulty component. Ultimately, the 
problem stemmed from default firewall settings within Microsoft Internet Explorer on the 
SEEK II. Students installed Mozilla Firefox web browser onsite, resolving connectivity 
failure between the SEEK II and the SOFEX Portal. 
With the issue resolved, researchers on the boarded vessel contacted YBI-based 
CENETIX personnel to coordinate the biometric sharing phase of the experiment. During 
coordination, it became evident that network performance had degraded, despite the fact 
that the vessels remained in place and no changes had been made to the infrastructure. 
Earlier CENETIX experiments had experienced similar issues caused by inadequate 
range between quad radios (5.8 GHz band) on boarded vessel and relay nodes. Feedback 
from the August MIO experiment in Alameda, California suggested replacing all, or part 
of, the quad radio’s standard omnidirectional antenna (3 X 120° sector 8 dBi) with a 
higher gain directional antenna [43].  
One of three standard 120° sector antennas on the boarded vessel’s WR quad 
radio was replaced with a 60° 18 dBi directional antenna. The antenna selection was 
intended to increase gain and improve signal to noise ratio to improve the quality of the 
data link between the boarded vessel and the nearest afloat relay node. This change to the 
network resulted in a considerable increase in network performance, as indicated by 
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ICMP ping results between the Solar Winds laptop onboard Adm. Callaghan and the 
CENETIX server. These measurements are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3.   Antenna Selection Impact on Network Performance 
 Baseline During Network 
Degradation 
Post-install of 60° 18 
dBi Sector Antenna 
Avg. Ping Sweep 
Range 
20–35 ms 85–100 ms 5–15 ms 
Throughput 2.53 Mbps Not Measured 3.43 Mbps 
 
After increasing the speed and reliability of the data link, CENETIX researchers 
once again began the biometric data sharing portion of the experiment. Researchers 
attempted to transmit biometrics to the SOFEX portal using the two wireless models 
described in this document’s concept of operations.  
First, researchers enabled the 802.11 WAP on the MPU4 and selected the radio’s 
default 802.11 access point configurations. This selection forced the MPU4 to 
automatically select the operating frequency, and operate using the 20 MHz bandwidth 
(channel width). Using this model, researchers were able to access the CENETIX server 
and the SOFEX portal quickly. Researchers transmitted EFT and XML files, which 
contained full biometric enrollments for two role players, to both destinations. Placement 
of the files on the CENETIX server’s collaboration portal was instantaneous. The 
SOFEX portal received the biometric enrollments and returned a match/no-match 
response in under one minute. This response came in two forms, a viewable “green 
return” on the SOFEX web-based graphical user interface (GUI) and via a standard 
SMTP email to the account’s registered user. Using the Solar Winds laptop, researchers 
monitored network performance during enrollment and response. As shown in Table 4, 
ping sweep data and throughput measurements were comparable to baseline 
measurements. Measurements were taken with the SEEK II located at 25 ft. and 50 ft. 
from the WAP. 
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Next, researchers disabled the 802.11 WAP on the MPU4 and tethered the SEEK 
II directly to the MPU4 using a standard Ethernet cable produced by Persistent Systems. 
Similarly, researchers gained immediate access to the CENETIX server and the SOFEX 
portal. They executed the enrollment process again and monitored network performance. 
Match response time was virtually identical, and network performance metrics were 
similar to those collected during 802.11 Wi-Fi operation and baseline measurements.  












10–20 ms 10–20 ms 10–20 ms 10–20 ms 
Throughput 3.24 Mbps 3.37 Mbps 3.21 Mbps 3.37 Mbps 
4. Experiment Observation and Conclusions 
The eight significant takeaways from this experiment are listed as follows. 
• Adding a WR 802.11 WAP to the standard WR MANET provided 
wireless connectivity to the SEEK II with sufficient data rates for 
transmitting biometric enrollments (XML or EFT files) to the authoritative 
SOFEX biometrics database and receiving NRT match/no-math response.  
• SEEK II tethered easily to the WR MPU4 using a standard Ethernet cable, 
which provided a wireless reach back to the SOFEX biometrics database, 
with sufficient data rates for transmitting biometric enrollments (XML or 
EFT files) to the authoritative SOFEX biometrics database and receiving 
NRT match/no-math response.  
• Both models provide mobility to MIO operators and support wireless 
reach back model for biometric data sharing. 
• In this case, differences in network performance between the two 
proposed models were negligible. However, this experiment only 
implemented one node (the SEEK II) competing for 802.11 Wi-Fi 
resources provided by the MPU4 WAP. Researchers expect that multiple 
Wi-Fi devices connected to one MPU4 WAP would result in reduced data 
rates for those nodes as a result of shared access on a half-duplex Wi-Fi 
link. 
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• Testing showed that tethered operations were marginally faster. For 
example, after the addition of the of 60° 18 dBi Sector Antenna, baseline 
throughput of the WR MANET was 3.43 Mbps. When the SEEK II was 
added to the MANET as a tethered device, throughput was measured at 
3.37 Mbps (with the SEEK II and MPU4 in various locations)—
approximately a 1.8% reduction in data rate, when compared to baseline. 
When the SEEK II was added as an 802.11 Wi-Fi node using the MPU4 
WAP, throughput was measured at 3.21 Mbps (with SEEK II located 50 
ft. from WAP)—approximately a 6.4% reduction in data rate. As stated in 
the third conclusion, additional Wi-Fi nodes would increase demand on a 
single WAP, and could significantly increase this performance delta. 
• The MPU4 802.11 WAP will only operate simultaneously with the WR 
2.4 GHz band when configured to operate with the 20 MHz channel width. 
According to Herbert Rubens of Persistent Systems,  
If the MPU4 is running on a 20 MHz ISM Band channel and a Wi-
Fi access point is enabled, it can both run the access point and the 
MANET at the same time. It uses the AP as a wireless wire, 
meaning the behavior for the wireless client should be the same as 
a laptop connected to the MPU4 with an Ethernet cable. The 
802.11 client should be able to talk to other devices and radios in 
the network and do everything you would expect it to do [21]. 
• The static route on the VPN router is a useful option for simultaneously 
providing reach back to protected networks and assets residing on the 
Internet. 
• As mentioned previously, following the August CENETIX TNT MIO 
WMD ISR scenario, the USCG Research and Development Center and 
CENETIX made four recommendations to optimize the CENETIX tactical 
network. Only the antenna selection recommendation was implemented in 
this experiment. As previously mentioned, the addition of a 60° 18 dBi 
directional antenna resulted in measurable improvements in link quality 
and network performance. The remaining three recommendations were not 
possible in this experiment. Operating the 802.11 WAP on the WR MPU 4 
required researchers to utilize the 20 MHz channel width setting, rather 
than the lower settings recommended. WR MPU4 radios used in this 
experiment were not capable of operating at the lower frequency or higher 
power settings recommended.  
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III. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
Analysis and field experiment outcomes from Chapter III provide the basis for 
some basic conclusions that address the research questions in this thesis. However, 
additional analysis considering the totality of this research is necessary to provide 
ultimate conclusions and recommendations. 
A. WIRELESS BIOMETRICS AND INFORMATION DOMINANCE 
Analysis of the relationship between wireless biometric data sharing and 
information dominance in the maritime domain is straightforward. As stated in [1], 
information sharing in the maritime domain is key in executing the nation’s maritime 
strategy. Concepts and principles described in [8]–[10] demonstrate the DOD’s and the 
Navy reliance on timely and accurate information to enable decision makers and 
operators on the tactical edge. The definition of identity dominance in [9] lends itself to 
the accomplishment of information dominance by directly addressing the notions of 
assured C2 and battlespace awareness, two of the three fundamental capabilities of 
information dominance, as defined by [9]. 
Selecting the most optimal mode of wireless biometric data sharing in MIO not 
only improves performance of the wireless tactical MANET, but also improves the 
efficiency of identification and verification operations, which in turn, improves 
identification dominance that can synergistically enhance information dominance. Thus, 
opportunities are created to leverage the cyber and information domains to support the 
mission success in MIO, and effectively, implement maritime strategy. 
B. WAVE RELAY OPTIMIZATION 
Optimizing the MANET tactical network is primarily related to three constraints: 
tactical network component specifications (radios and antennas), range between nodes, 
and environmental conditions related to MIO settings. While operators cannot control 
environmental factors, such as weather and atmospherics, range can be addressed through 
antenna selection and device configuration on the MANET. Additionally, available 
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tactical radios, such as WR, are available with a variety of specifications and 
configuration options that can be tailored to operational requirements. For instance, 
missions requiring significant boarding team communication below decks might require 
radios with different power and frequency characteristics than would be ideal for routine 
operations occurring on the exterior of the boarded vessel. Tailored radio selection 
accounts for such differences. 
1. Replacing Omnidirectional Antenna with Sector Antenna 
As stated in Chapter III, replacing the standard WR 8 dBi omnidirectional antenna 
with an 18 dBi 60° vertical sector antenna resulted in improved network performance. 
Improvements were a result of improved SNR as a result of increased directivity and gain 
characteristics of the new antenna. As explained by Atayero and Luka in [44], using the 
ideal link equation given in Equation 1, where Pr is the received power and all other 
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= e from Tx to Rx in meters  
Equation 1.  Ideal Link Equation 
Using the ideal link equation, because Gt was increased by 10 dB or a factor of 
10, the power received was then increased by a factor of 10. Therefore, the SNR was also 
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increased by a factor of 10 or 10Db.2 In this case, only the transmit antenna was replaced. 
However, if the same antenna was used at the transmitting and receiving node, Gt in both 
antennas would have increased by a factor of 10, and the power received would increase 
by a factor of 100, which would result in a 20 dB increase in SNR. Clearly, increased 
antenna directivity, and thus increased gain, provides opportunities to improve link 
quality significantly across the WR MANET. 
2. Range between MANET NODES 
Distance between nodes also impacts link quality, which can be addressed by 
physically decreasing the distance between vessels or by simply adding appropriately 
placed nodes on the network As stated in Chapter III, the 6 dB rule of thumb is useful is 
approximating the effectiveness of these actions, assuming that additional nodes are 
placed at a points between and equidistant to nodes. Consider the ideal link equation 
again. If all parameters remain constant, except for R1, then the equation easily reduces, 









Equation 2.  Describing 6 dB Rule of Thumb 
Equation 2 shows that if the range is doubled then power received is reduced by a factor 
of 4, or 6 dB. Likewise, if the range is halved, power received is increased by the same. 
The application of antenna theory in preparation for future CENETIX field experiments 
could prove useful in network design elements, such as node and vessel placement in 
maritime settings. 
2 As stated in Chapter III, the distance between vessels remained approximately 0.5 nautical miles 
(926 meters) throughout the experiment.  
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C. SEEK II INTEGRATION MODELS 
1. Performance 
Experiment results from October 2014 indicated faster ping sweep times and 
greater throughput for the Ethernet tethered model of operation, as was true at distances 
of 25 ft. and 50 ft. for Wi-Fi3 operations. Several explanations for these results follow.  
The SEEK II wireless NIC and the MPU4 WAP mode support 802.11n, or 
Wireless N standards. Maximum data rate over Wireless N is dependent upon many 
variables. In the best case scenario, with multiple antennas and operating on the 40 MHz 
channel width setting, Wireless N is capable of speeds up to 600 Mbps. As stated earlier, 
the WR MANET utilized the MPU4 to provide a WAP. This utilization was a constraint 
because the WR MPU4 has only one antenna and is designed only to operate as a WAP 
while using the 20 MHz channel width setting. These factors limited the maximum data 
rate of the 802.11 Wi-Fi link between the SEEK II and the WAP to approximately 150 
Mbps. 
On the other hand, modern gigabit Ethernet connections can obtain data rates of 
up to 1 Gbps, or 1000 Mbps, which is much faster than Wireless N [45]. WR radios and 
SEEK II both support gigabit Ethernet connections. These higher data rates occur 
because wired Ethernet simply does not suffer from many of the variables that contribute 
to free space path loss.  
Moreover, in the October experiment, the SEEK II benefitted from a dedicated 
Ethernet connection. The tethering approach, preferred by Persistent Systems, ensures it 
would be the case no matter how many SEEK devices are added to the network in this 
manner. The same cannot be said for 802.11 Wi-Fi operation of the SEEK II on the WR 
MANET. Multiple SEEKs operating Wi-Fi would compete for WAP resources and be 
allocated less time on the channel that would result in slower data rates. Additionally, the 
half-duplex nature of Wi-Fi operation necessitates a collision avoidance mechanism; in 
this case, carrier sense multiple access, collision avoidance (CSMA-CA). The additional 
3 These distances were used as controls for tethered operation as well, even though those distances are 
quite insignificant when the wireless portion of the link occurs only over WR. 
 52 
                                                 
overhead required to carry out CSMA-CA makes Wi-Fi even more inefficient than 
Ethernet by reducing the payload per packet to support avoidance. 
2. Security 
The primary question about security in this thesis addresses the connection 
between the SEEK II and the MANET. To be clear, the tethering model is not impacted 
by security concerns inherent to Wi-Fi networking, which increases the overall security 
of the system. However, neither of the modes of operation considered in this work benefit 
from the assurance of FIPS 140-2 certification where the SEEK II, or to the traffic 
between the SEEK and the MANET, is concerned because the cryptographic boundary of 
the WR does not extend beyond the radios themselves. Therefore, FIPS-140 2 
certification, based on WR’s built-in security model, does not extend to other devices 
added to the MANET, such as the SEEK II. To be sure, while FIPS certification does not 
apply to either model, the tethering model does benefit from the inherently more secure 
Ethernet link between the SEEK II. 
 In a MIO environment, operators carry the MPU4 strapped to their person. The 
operator personally holds the SEEK II device during operation. The physical 24 inch 
Ethernet connection between the devices provides the operator positive control over the 
devices and their connection. This scenario offers obvious security benefits over a model, 
which requires wireless operation between the operator’s SEEK II and an a potentially 
unmanned MPU4 [33]. 
It is worthwhile to examine the way in which each model handles encryption and 
decryption. The tethering model uses only the WR encryption scheme between WR 
nodes and no encryption across the Ethernet link. The Wi-Fi model depends on WPA2-
PSK to protect data between the WR WAP and Wi-Fi devices, such as the SEEK II. The 
WR MANET uses AES-256 for encrypting and decrypting network traffic, while the WR 
WAP approaches these functions using WPA2-PSK, which utilizes AES-128. Clearly, 
the larger key size of the WR MANET offers greater security. It also does not require the 
use of a PSK. While still a common form of encryption for home users, WPS2-PSK is not 
appropriate for enterprise use or in systems carrying sensitive data. As early as 2010, 
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WPA2-PSK was proven susceptible to the Hole 196 exploit, which compromises the 
shared key completely over the air [46]. In a WPA2-PSK implementation, if only one 
user’s key is compromised all users are compromised. Therefore, given the sensitive 
nature of MIO operations, avoiding the use of WPA2-PSK may be desirable. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis explored methods to improve mission success in U.S. Navy maritime 
interdiction operations by improving information dominance in the maritime domain by 
optimizing the CENETIX tactical network for wirelessly sharing biometric data within 
the tactical environments, and ultimately, providing reach back to authoritative biometric 
databases, such as the DOD ABIS. Research efforts intended to, first, optimize the 
broader CENETIX WR MANET. Secondly, it was meant to determine the feasibility of 
leveraging 802.11 Wi-Fi technology for the integration of the SEEK II to the WR 
MANET, and to provide a comparative analysis between a 802.11 Wi-Fi operation of the 
SEEK II and the WR tethering approach to conducting wireless operation. The research 
questions in Chapter I directed all research efforts. This chapter provides answers to those 
questions based on data collection and observations from CENETIX field experiments, as 
well as recommendations for future work in this area. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The wireless sharing of biometric data in MIO can provide operators with reach 
back to authoritative databases, such as the DOD ABIS, which enables NRT biometric 
analysis for new biometric enrollments collected during MIO. This sharing enhances the 
DOD’s ability to achieve identity dominance, which directly contributes to mission 
success by supporting successful execution of the Navy’s information dominance 
strategy. 
Slight modifications to the CENETIX tactical network can improve MANET 
performance to enhance biometric data sharing at the tactical edge, provide an 
opportunity for operator reach back to authoritative DOD biometric databases to improve 





• Replacing WR omnidirectional antennas with higher gain directional 
antennas 
• Selecting tactical radios with frequency and output power characteristics 
appropriate for the maritime domain and tactical environment 
These modifications can result in improved SNR and greater link quality to ensure 
success in biometric data sharing across the tactical network and contribute to reliable 
and efficient reach back to decision makers and authoritative databases. 
Wireless integration of the SEEK II and the WR MANET, using the 802.11 WAP, 
is a feasible model for wirelessly sharing biometric data at the tactical edge. However, 
network performance should be expected to decrease as the number of SEEK II, or 
similar, devices on a single WR WAP increase. The SEEK II connection to the WAP 
precludes the use of WR FIPS 140-2 accredited data encryption, but the WR and SEEK II 
both support WPA2-SPK encryption, which offers some level of security for the data in 
transit between the SEEK II and WR WAP. 
Of the two models of wireless SEEK II operation considered in this work, the 
tethering model offers greater network performance, and is inherently more secure than 
the 802.11 Wi-Fi model. The tethering model should be the preferred method of 
integrating the SEEK II, or similar biometric devices, to the tactical MANET. 
The 802.11 Wi-Fi integration model may be suitable in situations in which the 
number of available tactical radios is a constraint. Multiple SEEK II devices can connect 
to a single WAP that allowed them access to the MANET, and ultimately provide reach 
back. Conversely, the tethering model requires one tactical radio for each SEEK II or Wi-
Fi device. The Wi-Fi model provides an option of limited hardware footprints to boarding 
teams. 
Ultimately, research on the CENETIX tactical network shows that 802.11 Wi-Fi 
is a feasible method for connecting the SEEK II and similar devices to the tactical 
MANET; however, in most cases, tethering SEEK II biometric devices directly to tactical 
radio via Ethernet provides the most optimal performance and increases network security 
for conducting biometric data sharing during MIO.  
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B. FUTURE WORKS 
Many opportunities exist for future work on this topic. Two are key, and would be 
well suited for near-term exploration. 
1. Optimization of the Tactical MANET 
This study considered MIO scenarios that were present in CENETIX field 
experiments. In these scenarios, relay nodes were largely static to support the specific 
MIO objectives outlined in field experiment planning. However, many variables exist 
that could prove very dynamic in alternative scenarios with different objectives. To 
discover more optimal tactical network design and implementation for a range of MIO 
scenarios, continuous throughput testing should be accomplished to include continuously 
altering antennas, distance between nodes, bearing to nodes, radio power, and radio 
frequency configuration, while researchers monitor the network’s performance and 
capture data about throughput. During continuous testing, various types of MIO 
operations should be simulated that require the transmission and reception of various 
types and sizes of data across the MANET. Capturing data from continuous throughput 
monitoring allow CENETIX researchers to analyze the findings and determine a range of 
optimization efforts, which can be applied to specific scenarios. Moreover, it could result 
in finding one “best” solution that offers the greatest opportunity to achieve information 
dominance in MIO and support mission success, when various constraints make 
customization undesirable or impossible. 
2. Layer 2 MANET Security 
At the tactical edge, the strictly layer 2 operation of the MANET offers many 
benefits, but also introduces specific security concerns. Research such as [16] is available 
regarding MANET security. However, a knowledge gap occurs regarding how known 
layer 2 cyber vulnerabilities impact the maritime domain. Thorough analysis of existing 
research on MANET security can help form some experiments. The CENETIX tactical 
network provides an opportunity for penetration testing and vulnerability analysis.  
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